Kendall-Taylor: Remind listeners too who was president in Riyadh. It was the head of the Russian Direct Investment Bank, which is a clear signal of the way that the Russians are approaching the administration.
Kofman: Yeah, they’re pitching them business deals. They’re trying to, in their mind, outbid Ukraine. Offering greater opportunities. And they’re trying to position sanctions against Russia as a big opportunity cost for us, which it isn’t. Even before those sanctions…if I were to show you the net volume of trade between US and Russia, it was tiny. Even though it had some critical material categories in there, like titanium and whatnot, things that are important to certain industries. But nonetheless, it was incredibly small. It was Europe that the principal balance of trade with Russia, not us. There isn’t a rush to the door of companies trying to get back into Russia – I’m sorry, you’re not going to see this. To me, Trump’s approach is much more looking for wins right now, and things that can be declared as wins rather than big-picture strategy. I also think that your question about Russia and China…isn’t really the way they’re thinking about it and wouldn’t work anyway. I don’t think that they’re trying to pull Russia away from China, and I’ve been very public in the past that I don’t think that that would work; I think that this is a magical misreading of Cold War history and I’m happy to get into why, but it’s…the sort of thing that briefs well and policy wonks can talk about but doesn’t work in practice. I don’t think that they’re trying to do that, though. From what I’ve seen, Trump does have some guiding views and preferences. If I may summarize them, and I’m no expert on the Trump administration, but it’s great-power politics over alliance bloc politics. It’s trying to end wars that he thinks are bad for everyone economically. Even if he doesn’t have the correct perception of who started the war, why the war took place, or what the consequences are of ending it, he’s prioritizing ending it in some shape or form. It’s pursuing naked-self interest over allies or traditional values. Kind of the old Lord Palmerston quote of “there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, only permanent interests”. A lot of conversations I have about the Trump administration seem to be people observing that someone has put a hole in the wall and trying to draw a target around it after the fact. It’s like post-hoc rationalizing of what’s taken place. I’m wary of that approach.
Last point. On my last comment about casualties, keep in mind that this is just a dart thrown at a wall by me, not statistics that you should take to the bank. Please don’t take that as “Mike Kofman gave a hard estimate” – there’s a pretty big cone of uncertainty on that.
Kofinas: Thanks for that. Next hour, want to talk about nuclear doctrine. Are we looking at a new approach to foreign policy that will transcend administrations, and what sort of world order will that create? Like, more realpolitik. Also want to talk about future of security in Europe. One thing that we can all agree on right now is that Europe has a lot of problems. [Kofinas then promotes a premium subscription for additional content.]
[continued from parent]
Kendall-Taylor: Remind listeners too who was president in Riyadh. It was the head of the Russian Direct Investment Bank, which is a clear signal of the way that the Russians are approaching the administration.
Kofman: Yeah, they’re pitching them business deals. They’re trying to, in their mind, outbid Ukraine. Offering greater opportunities. And they’re trying to position sanctions against Russia as a big opportunity cost for us, which it isn’t. Even before those sanctions…if I were to show you the net volume of trade between US and Russia, it was tiny. Even though it had some critical material categories in there, like titanium and whatnot, things that are important to certain industries. But nonetheless, it was incredibly small. It was Europe that the principal balance of trade with Russia, not us. There isn’t a rush to the door of companies trying to get back into Russia – I’m sorry, you’re not going to see this. To me, Trump’s approach is much more looking for wins right now, and things that can be declared as wins rather than big-picture strategy. I also think that your question about Russia and China…isn’t really the way they’re thinking about it and wouldn’t work anyway. I don’t think that they’re trying to pull Russia away from China, and I’ve been very public in the past that I don’t think that that would work; I think that this is a magical misreading of Cold War history and I’m happy to get into why, but it’s…the sort of thing that briefs well and policy wonks can talk about but doesn’t work in practice. I don’t think that they’re trying to do that, though. From what I’ve seen, Trump does have some guiding views and preferences. If I may summarize them, and I’m no expert on the Trump administration, but it’s great-power politics over alliance bloc politics. It’s trying to end wars that he thinks are bad for everyone economically. Even if he doesn’t have the correct perception of who started the war, why the war took place, or what the consequences are of ending it, he’s prioritizing ending it in some shape or form. It’s pursuing naked-self interest over allies or traditional values. Kind of the old Lord Palmerston quote of “there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, only permanent interests”. A lot of conversations I have about the Trump administration seem to be people observing that someone has put a hole in the wall and trying to draw a target around it after the fact. It’s like post-hoc rationalizing of what’s taken place. I’m wary of that approach.
Last point. On my last comment about casualties, keep in mind that this is just a dart thrown at a wall by me, not statistics that you should take to the bank. Please don’t take that as “Mike Kofman gave a hard estimate” – there’s a pretty big cone of uncertainty on that.
Kofinas: Thanks for that. Next hour, want to talk about nuclear doctrine. Are we looking at a new approach to foreign policy that will transcend administrations, and what sort of world order will that create? Like, more realpolitik. Also want to talk about future of security in Europe. One thing that we can all agree on right now is that Europe has a lot of problems. [Kofinas then promotes a premium subscription for additional content.]