Rob: Sure. Main conversation right now is on ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles. Reporting say that even though Storm Shadow/SCALP made by Britain and France, contain US components so US has a say in how they’re used. JASSM’s been introduced more-recently; also question about whether they’ll be allowed to be used in Russian territory. More-important factor with JASSM is that quantities may be greater. Ukraine fired a lot of Storm Shadow/SCALPs last summer; not sure what the replenishment rate is. Also concern with ATACMS, because Ukraine fired not-insignificant number of ATACMS. At some point, US could give more but may also look at other constraints and might not want to give more. First-off, conversations sometimes focus on all-or-nothing, either weapon will have huge benefits or no benefits. If US permits ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes in Russian territory, there will be military benefits. Important not to downplay that. Steve wrote an article for Foreign Affairs saying that it’s not going to be decisive, and I agree with that. If we allow ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes, it’s not going to win the war for Ukraine…but it can support it. In supporting Ukraine, there’s never just one silver bullet; it’s wholistic. If Ukraine has a capability, it can make plans using it; if not, have to adjust plans. Some things that it cannot achieve: a lot of the Russian missile attacks on Ukraine would not be affected by Storm Shadow or ATACMS. They’re ALCMs launched by strategic bombers that operate more than 300 km from the border from Ukraine. Most glide bombs dropped by Russian Su-34 bombers that no longer operate within 300 km of the border either. They used to be closer, but now they’re pushed back. Releasing Storm Shadow or ATACMS would not be a full solution to either of those problems. What could it help with? Russia has a number of logistics facilities across the border. Right now, Ukraine mostly uses the mid-range ATACMS that uses cluster munitions to go after air defense systems in occupied territories. S-300, S-400. That’s been the priority for quite a long time, and they do this with dynamic targeting, which ATACMS are useful for. That would be quite useful in Kursk to degrade Russian air defense capabilities in that region, which can also allow other operations. Also useful because a lot of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign conducted via Ukranian-produced weapons, drones, we know they have cruise missile programs, we know they have ballistic missile programs, so if you knock out a bunch of the Russian air defense systems on the border, that could potentially make it easier for Ukraine to perform long-range strikes into Russia. Now, the US may not want to be part of that, but it would help. Another factor is that when the US made the policy change in May to allow the strikes into Russia with HIMARS, the initial effect was that Russia launched a lot of S-300/S-400 missiles as ground defense missiles, consistently struck Kharkiv with that. After HIMARS were allowed, they knocked out a couple of S-300s the first day, and after that there were no S-300/S-400 attacks on Kharkiv for at least a month after that point. A few days ago, there were a few strikes on Kharkiv with S-300s/S-400s. ATACMS would be more-effective; they have a longer range than GMLRS. That would be one justification, saying that we’re trying to help the civilians at Kharkiv; ATACMS could be part of that. It could be the way that happens; we’ve seen before that initially the Biden administration provided shorter-range ATACMS, then later the longer-range ones. The same thing could happen with strikes on Russia. In the Kursk operation, it looks like Ukraine is there to stay for some time. Zelenskyy has mentioned it as a bargaining chip; in order for it to be useful for that, you have to hold it. Allowing ATACMS strikes into Russia will make it easier for Ukraine to hold that area in Kursk. Won’t solve everything, but can knock out tube artillery concentrations, can knock out logistics, all that kind of thing. Variety of ways that that could be useful. I don’t think that it will be decisive. It comes back to the risk/reward and escalation. It would be useful, it would pose more problems for Russia, and that’s one of the considerations here, is that Russia’s strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure is a really significant problem. In Mike and my article, we talk about the fighting in Kursk and Donetsk. Most of that is at a tactical/operational level. The strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure have strategic significance, could lead to a situation where winning the war is much much more difficult for Ukraine. I think that the implications are greater. So it’s very important for Ukraine’s supporters to come up with a plan to compel Russia to stop these strikes. Allowing Storm Shadow/ATACMS is not enough, because the range is not enough. Right now, Ukraine is going after Russian energy infrastructure, we’ve seen with the power plants and refineries, UAVs, and I assume that that’s going to continue into winter. Maybe that’s going to get to a point where Russia decides to make a deal, says “You know what? Let’s make a deal, maybe not go after each other’s energy infrastructure because it’s becoming painful for us.” But ultimately, Western countries need to come up with a plan here, because it’s a really significant issue for Ukraine. Ukraine’s long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will not defeat Russia. But if it makes Russia stop striking Ukrainian infrastructure, then it could be strategically-critical. It will help Ukraine sustain the war, which could have strategic benefits on its own. If there’s a concern about ATACMS or similar, maybe there’s a role for subsidizing Ukrainian-produced missiles or similar. Maybe that’s the workaround, I don’t know. Russia’s a bigger country; Ukraine has to find ways to compel Russia. If Western countries don’t come up with some kind of plan, then Ukraine’s going to go come up with their own internal capabilities, so I think that that’s the kind of discussion that we would have.

Max: Mike, anything to add? Thanks, Rob.

Mike: Lot of good points, Rob. I think that the main challenge in our provision of capabilities has been that in boiling the frog, we’ve transferred capabilities out of sequence with combat operations, because could not realize advantages when initially deployed to operationally-significant effect. Ukraine would want a capability at scale then, but often we have provided in fairly small numbers, often after operation, so come up a day late and dollar short, probably fairest criticism overall of our approach. As to Rob’s argument on Steve’s point about the best being the enemy of the useful. Aside from aircraft which are out of range, Russia does have a lot of things within range that could be targeted and it would force upon them a significant adjustment period. That could sap momentum, cause a degree of disorganization, could give Ukraine an advantage for a period of, say, a few months. Rob touched on ability of our capabilities to degrade Russian air defense and thus enable Ukrainian strikes, and I think that that’s a better way to look at it. And compelling Russia to end the campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Why? We are not going to find enough air defense in terms of both systems and munitions to cover Ukrainian airspace. We’re not going to be able to do it such that Ukraine can defend critical infrastructure like energy, its cities; people, and its front line. Not with expanded Russian missile production. My view is that an expanded strike campaign which Ukraine would be running in Russia would be a much better campaign than expanded strike campaign in Crimea, which they have been running this year with Western support, which in practice has not been setting the conditions for anything. It’s a year after the campaign that was meant to get to Crimea, no follow-up campaign to strike campaign likely to occur. Already led to significant adaptation by Russian forces in terms of intercept rates on ATACMS; not marginal by a long shot. Ukraine has used fairly large number of ALCMs and – won’t say how many – fairly large number of ATACMS as well. If one is to use munitions at this rate, would want to use them in way that would achieve real effects for you. I think it would be much better to have actual strike campaign against Russian critical infrastructure or Russian air defense in Russia enabling Ukrainian drone strikes in Russia, or try to achieve limited aims such as cession of Russian strike campaign itself. I have understood Crimean operation is end in-and-of-itself in that it degrades Russian air defense, will do as an operation until a better one gets here, but also clear that Ukrainians are not making much of it. Kursk offensive is good example that Ukraine wants to achieve leverage over Russia in different way than campaign we have been supporting.

Maria: On numbers, Michael, you mentioned number of weapons systems offered to Ukraine. US has roughly 370 HIMARS systems, and as of May 2024, had sent roughly 40+ to Ukraine, about 4,000 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, but as of May has sent only 300 to Ukraine. For March 5, Abrams tanks about 4,600 in stocks, only 30 to Ukraine. More than 60 Patriot air defense batteries, only one sent to Ukraine. How explain that? Understand that military planners may have different vision, but why so little offered? Is it different priorities? Is it concerns about how Ukraine is going to use it? Corruption in Ukraine? But I think that Ukraine has proved itself quite capable of using those. Would be interesting to get a perspective; Rob, maybe start with you.